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# A major malfunction

## Challenger's brief flight

**.678 seconds**  
Following Challenger's liftoff, a puff of black smoke is seen only by automatic launch cameras— indicates a problem with one of the O-ring seals at the joint between segments of the shuttle's right-hand solid rocket booster.


No human eyes see the smoke, and there would have been no way to abort the flight if they had.

**58 seconds**  
A small jet of smoke and flame bursts through the side of the booster and quickly grows.

**73 seconds**  
The flame burns through the strut attaching the solid rocket booster to the external fuel tank, causing the booster to swivel into the side of the tank. The resulting massive explosion destroys the space shuttle.

**Full thrust**  
Once the boosters ignite, there is no way to shut them off.

**3 minutes, 58 seconds**  
Challenger's crew compartment, which appeared to come away from the exploding shuttle more or less intact, smashes into the Atlantic Ocean at 200 mph. Officials never determined whether the shuttle's explosion or the impact with the ocean killed the crew.



SOURCE: NASA THE PLAIN DEALER



Challenger disaster history. Challenger disaster how many died. Details of the challenger disaster. Challenger disaster explained. Challenger disaster facts.

Unfortunately, the vitality of the test program has been reduced due to budgetary restrictions. The number of engine test shooting per month has decreased in the last two years. The accident also focused attention on the issues of arbitrators abort capacities and crew escape. A firm useful load assignment policy should be established. The Commission is concerned about what seems to be a propensity to management in Marshall to contain potentially serious problems and try to solve them internally instead of communicating them forward. 9. Then it is suggested, therefore, that the risk is no longer so high for the next flights. This redefinition must give the program administrator the authority required for operations in progress STS. You should try to make emergency landing more feasible in case of failures in the early engine. Light rate ... To reduce the pressure more launch, the exclusive dependence on the shuttle should be avoided. In fact, the events that led to the destruction of the challenger progressed very quickly and without prior notice. An early plan contemplated an eventual rate of a mission a week, but realism forced several revisions to the downside. Specific fault was the destruction of seals that are destined to prevent hot gases from escaping through the joint during the propellant burn of the rocket engine. The contributing cause of the accident, the decision to launch the challenger was defective. Preparation reviews and meetings of the administration team must be recorded. These people led their positions the flight experience and a grateful appreciation of the operations and security of flight. \* NASA should promote the transition from astronauts qualified to the management positions of the Agency. \* The function of the director Flight crew operations should rise in the structure of NASA's organization. The reddish brown colors of the hypergolic fuel burning are visible at the end of the main fireball. The room temperature at the time of it was 36 degrees Fahrenheit, or 15 degrees lower than the next previous cold launch. Findings 1. Landing security should take measures to improve landing security. \* The tire, the brake and the gear wheel wheel direction system must be improved. During unpredictable climate periods in Kennedy, program officials must plan on Edwards landings. The financing of the transport element, the definition of the work package and the information of the vital program, often omits the manager of the STS-A National Program Redefinition of the responsibility of the program manager is essential. Launch of the Crew Income / Exhaust ... NASA should make every effort to provide an exhaust system of the crew. To preserve these articles as they originally appeared, times do not alter, edit or update. The digitization process introduces transcription errors or other problems; We continue working to improve these archived versions. The following are key portions of the text of the Rogers Commission Summary on the Challenger Space Tarmover Accident in Jan. The commission believes that the severe cold and the presence of both ice. In the fixed service structure, it made it advocate to launch at Jan's morning. Politics must include rigorous controls in changes in load manifest to limit pressures, such changes exert into schedules and training in crew. NASA and Thiokol accepted a risk of climbing apparently because "they escaped from the last time". As Commissioner Feynman observed, decision making was: "A kind of Russian roulette. However, long before Challenger's accident, he was becoming obvious that even the modified goal of two flights a month was the entrance and landing of the shuttle are dynamic and demanding with all the risks and complications inherent when flying a heavyweight glider with a very steep sliding path. The estimated flame position, centered at a point of 307 degrees around the circumference of the joint of the aft field, was confirmed by the Of two fragments of the right solid rocket reinforcement. Neither NASA nor Thiokol performed an analysis of this type; Consequently, they were not prepared to adequately evaluate the risks of launching the 51-L mission under extreme conditions of what they had been found before. Site launch activities, including assembly and preparation, from the reception of the flight hardware to the launch, generally agreed with the established procedures and were not considered a factor in the accident. The evidence examined in the revision of the space shuttle material, manufacturing, assembly, quality control and the processing of No Wage Reports did not find flight hardware sent to the launch site that fell outside the limits of the specifications of Ferry designer. -Flight and Water Impact Cargars. \* The certification of the new design must include: -Tetes that duplicate the real launch configuration as soon as possible. - Pelling procedures. The reductions in the safety, reliability and quality guarantee force at Marshall Headquarters and NASA have a seriously limited capacity in these vital functions. Although it is understood that decisions must be made at the launch of a transport service, the commission is not convinced of levels 1 and 2, with the appropriate consideration. Rockwell's concern on ice. Between that period and 1986, however, the program became ineffective. When flights come in quick succession, the current requirements do not ensure that the critical anomalies that occur during a flight are identified and are adequately addressed before the next flight. Transportation program officials must recognize that Edwards is an essential normal part of the program. The Commission was worried that a margin of insufficient safety Having existed in areas other than the ascent of the shuttle. Given the ice extension on the pillow (see photos of the pages 112 and 113), the admitted unknown effect of the solid rocket engine and the space shuttle, the main engines turn on the ice, as well as the fact made The rubble that hits the orbiter was a potential flight security danger, the commission finds the decision to throw questionable in those circumstances. It failed again in the stranger sequence of six consecutive launch restriction exemptions before 51-L, which allows it to fly without any registration of an exemption or even an explicit restriction. Of 21 launches with environmental temperatures of 61 degrees Fahrenheit or greater, only four show signs of tallous anguish of the Torric Board; I.E., Erosion or blown and Hollen. System capabilities stretched up to the limit to support the flight speed in winter 1985-1986. Careful attention is given to concerns expressed by astronauts because the space shuttle program will only have success if the highly qualified men and women who go to the transport service have confidence in the system. However, the Commission will not interpret its mandate to require a detailed investigation of all aspects of the Space Transfers Program, to review budgetary issues or to interfere with or replace Congress in any way in its functions. While the landings planned in Edwards (AA © rea Base in California) have a cost in dollars and days, climate realities can not be ignored. It seemed that it originated approximately 305 degrees around the reinforcement circumference in or near the stern field gasket. A movie film plus late from the same chamber, the flame was visible without improving the image. 3. However, the Commission has determined that ICE was not a cause of the accident of 51-L and does not conclude that the decision of NASA to endeavor specifically a non-launch recommendation of an element contractor. The lack of spare parts probably would have Limited flight in 1986. The increase in landings in Edwards may require a double ferry capacity. This committee must: \* Review and evaluate the certification requirements. \* Provide technical supervision of design, testing program and certification. \* Report to the of NASA on the adequacy of design and make appropriate recommendations when programmed and do not allow them to resign. \* Restore and support maintenance programs and spare parts and stop the practice of eliminating the parts of an orbiter to supply another. This was the most cold point of the joint. The mandate of the commission was: 1. The letter of this panel should include transport operational problems, launch commitment criteria, flight rules, flight preparation and risk management. The multiple snacks of smoke in this sequence occurred approximately four times per second, approximate the frequency of the structural load dynamics and the flexion of the resulting joint. It also provides a symbol of national pride and technological leadership. The Commission calls the spectacular achievements of NASA of the past and anticipates the impressive achievements that come. The orbiter, under severe aerodynamic loads, was broken into several large sections that arose from the fireball. The Commission concluded that Thiokol's administration invested its position and recommended the launch of 51-L, in the urgency of Marshall and contrary to the opinions of Him engineers to accommodate an important client. NASA should establish a flight rate that is consistent with its resources. The temperature to the position of 300 degrees The circumference of the right AFT field board was estimated at 28 degrees (more or less) 5 degrees Fahrenheit. The resignation of launch restrictions seems to have been at the expense of flight security. flight. At the same time (60 seconds), telemetry showed a pressure differential between the pressures of the camera in the right and left reinforcements. The leak was again clearly evident as a flame approximately 58 seconds on the flight. Continue Reading The Main StoryThe Shuttle Findings: A Long Series of FailureScredit ... The New York Times ArchivesSee The Article In Sites Original Context from June 10, 1986, Section C, Page 10BUY ReprintTimesMachine is an Exclusive Benefit for Home Delivery and Digital Subscribers. This is a digitized version of an article of the Times Print file, before the start of online publication in 1996. The other focuses on the tests, processing and assembly of the various elements of the shuttle. This review must identify those articles that must be improved before a flight to guarantee the success of the mission and flight safety. 15. There are no corrective actions that can be taken if the reinforcements do not operate correctly after the ignition; I.E., There is no capacity to separate a safety from a thrust driver or there is no capacity for the crew to escape the vehicle during the promotion of the first stage. The findings and recommendations presented in this report are aimed at contributing to the future success of NASA that the nation expects and requires as the 21st century approaches. The history of the erosion of the Torus Board presented at level 1 at NASA headquarters in August 1985 was sufficiently detailed to require corrective action before next flight. Check the circumstances surrounding the accident to establish the probable cause or causes of the accident and 2. There was no requirement to configure the ratings test engine, as it would be in flight, and the engines were proven static in one position horizontal, not in the position of vertical. The dependence on the flight rat in the transport service, since its main space launch capacity created an implacable pressure on NASA to increase the flight speed. These structures structures At 73,137 seconds, as evidenced by white vapors that appear in the interplanar region. With milliseconds, there was a massive burner, almost explosive, which is burned from the hydrogen stream from the lower part of the failed tank and the liquid oxygen violation in the interrupt area. His career, while traveling to a machine from 1.92 at an altitude of 46,000 feet, the challenger was totally wrapped in the explosive burn. The transmission of the vaporized material of the joint indicates that there was no full sealing action within the joint. A more distinctive breath of a more tangled snots were recorded between .836 and 2.5 seconds. Before the accident, nor NASA nor Thiokol fully understood the mechanism by which the joint sealing was performed. Finding the Commission is worried about three aspects of the ice problem on the pillow. You escaped, but it should not be done again and again. 4. The commission is difficult, like Mr. (Arnold) Aldrich, to conclude that there was a non-launch recommendation. 6. A cold ring it may not. 28, 1986 ... The panel should include the representation of the security organization, the operations of the mission and the Astronaut Office. (The shuttle) Fly (with the erosion of the Torric Board) and nothing happens. This Solid Reinforcement area faces the external tank. An audit panel, appointed by the National Research Council, must verify the adaptation of the effort and report directly to the NASA administrator. Thiokol's declared position was that, "The condition is not desirable, but it is acceptable. "Ni Thiokol or NASA expected the rubber rings or sealing of the joints to be touched by hot engine ignition gases, much less to partially burn. In this situation, the NASA seemed to be requiring that a Demonstrate that it was not safe to launch, instead of showing that it was safe. A well-structured and managed system that emphasizes safety would have marked increasing doubts. Increasing. The seal of the joint of the solid rocket reinforcement. Landing: another critical phase The consequences of the performance defective in any environment of dynamic and demanding flight can be catastrophic. The graphic analysis of the film's work of other cameras indicated that the initial smoke came from the sector from 270 to 310 degrees from the circumference of the aft field of the aforementioned rocket reinforcement. Independent Supervision The NASA Administrator should request the National Research Council to form an independent solid rocket design supervision committees to implement the design recommendations of the commission and supervise the designer effort . A series of smoke mouths were observed from the 51 l field gasket area of the aforementioned solid rocket reinforcement between 0.678 and 2,500 seconds after the ignition of flashing solid rocket engines. An analysis of all the testimonies and interviews states that Rockwell's recommendation at the launch was ambiguous. He agreed very responsible for waiting for the findings of the Commission before deciding as additional action could be necessary to carry out his responsibilities. For the first days after the accident, possibly due to the trauma resulting from the accident, NASA seemed to be retaining information on the accident of the public. The Commission concluded that the freezing protection plan for the launch pad 39b was inadequate. Commission recommendations The following are the main recommendations of the presidential commission on Shuttle Challenger accident: Design ... The defective joint and the solid rocket motor seal should be redesigned or removed by redesign from the rocket. Realistic tests must be carried out completely. Range of operating conditions, temperature. However, the main engines remain highly complex and critical components of the ferry that involve a risk element mainly because the important components of the engines are degraded more quickly. quickly. Use of flight that anticipated. However, there were significant conditions outside the round between the two segments attached in the joint of the aft stern field of the right solid motor (the joint that failed) 6. Astronauts in the administration the Commission observes that there seems to be a deviation of the Philosophy of the DA © each of 1960. and 1970 relate to the use of astronauts in management positions. This was the beginning of the structural failure of the hydrogen tank that culminated throughout the aft amount that was removed. A history of the problems related to rings and joint and did not know the initial written recommendation of the contractor who advises against the launch at temperatures less than 53 degrees Fahrenheit and the continuous opposition of engineers in (Morton) Thiokol after the administration invested his position. An accident rooted in the early design of history, the problem of solid rocket reinforcement of the space shuttle began with the defective design of its joint and increased, since the management of NASA and the contractor did not recognize it as A problem, then did not manage to fix it and finally treated it as an acceptable flight risk.Morton Thiokol Inc., the contractor, did not accept the implication of the tests at the beginning of the program that the design had a serious and unimpacted failure. NASA did not accept the judgment of its engineers that design was unacceptable, and as joint problems grew by number and severity, NASA minimized them in the and the management reports. Security Safety PanelNase should be a STS security consultancy report for the STS program manager. This smoke from the stern. Stern. The joint in the shuttle takeoff was the first sign of the flashing of the stamps of solid rocket lifting boards in STS 51-L. 5. "However, the control team of the mission or crew of 51-L had any warning of an imminent disaster. The flight crew commander or representative must participate in decisions about whether the transport service is Ready to fly and should certify that the crew is adequately prepared. Security security ... The tire address systems, the brake and the wheel of the gear wheel should be improved. The commission is concerned about Symptoms he sees. The implacable pressure to meet the demands of an accelerated flight program could have been adequately managed by NASA if he had insisted on the demanding procedures that were his hallmark during the Apollo program. No one thought to invite a representative of security or a reliability engineer and quality guarantee to January. The Commission recommends that NASA: \* Make all efforts to provide a Exhaust system of the crew for use during controlled sliding flight. \* Do everything possible to increase the range of flight conditions under which a landing of the emergency track can be performed with success in case two or three main engines fail early on the ascent. Demonstration policies declared were not applied. -The flight speed was not reduced to accommodate adjustment periods in the capacity of the workforce. Maintenance SafeGuardsInstallation, test and maintenance procedures must be especially rigorous for the designated space shuttle articles. The way to deal with a failure of this magnitude is to disclose all the facts in a total and open manner, to

take immediate action Correct errors that led to errors that led to errors. The ruling and continue with the program with renewed trust and determination. The Commission will interpret its mandate in general to include recommendations on security issues not necessarily involved in this accident, but that require care to make future flights more secure. The first span critical. Crites of a link flight. For example, considerations related to a possible premature termination of the mission during the promotion phase and risk factors related to the demanding approach and landing phase. They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's concern that it was not safe to launch due to ice on the pad. The ferry must land only at the EDWARDS ADEAR Force base until these systems are shown that meet the new criteria for landing in Kennedy. Therefore, a ring of or tibio will continue the opening of the tang-to-clevis gap. As the flight rate increased, the safety force, reliability and quality guarantee of Marshall was decreasing, which negatively affected the safety of the mission. If those responsible for decision-making knew all the facts, it is highly unlikely that they have decided to launch 51-L in January. These deviations directed the flame feather on the surface of the external tank. Little or no tendency analysis was performed on the erosion of the Tórico Board and blowing problems. The scheduled flight rate did not precisely reflect the capabilities and reimbursements. An important aspect of the main engine program has been extensive ground tests " hot fire ". Thought concluded The Commission urges that NASA continues to receive the support of the administration and nation. 16. In addition, the landing gear, which includes wheels, pneumatics and brakes, must work properly. In summary, although there are programmatic reasons válidas to land routinely in Kennedy, there are concerns that suggest that this is not prudent under current circumstances. . CONCLUSION OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF HESTOS, THE CONCESSION FULFILLED THAT THE CAUSE OF THE CHALLENGO ACCIDENT was the failure of the pressure seal on the AFT Field Board of the De Rohte SÁ "Lido Right. The last smoke was observed on the articulation of the field at 2,733 seconds. The black color and the dense composition of the smoke puffs suggest that the fat, the isolation of the joints and the rings or in the seal of the joint were being and eroded by hot propellant gases. The main motors of the shuttle and the solid rockets operated a reduced thrust that was approaching and passed through the area of the maximum dynamic pressure of 720 pounds per square foot. 28, and that the safety rings were exhausted too far. The organizational structures of Kennedy (Space Center) and Marshall have placed the security offices, reliability and quality guarantee under the supervision of organizations and activities whose efforts they must verify. As a result, it is likely that the rings of or on the correct solid reinforcement field gasket were not following the opening of the gap between Tang and the fork at the time of ignition. In a closed society, other options are available; In an open society, unless classified matters participate, other options are not, as a matter of law or as a practical issue. In this case, a vigorous investigation and the complete disclosure of the facts were needed. "Even if there had been any warning, there were no actions available for the crew or the mission control team to avoid disaster. 14. Environmental effects. The cost associated with regular, scheduled landing and change in EDWARDS is , therefore, a necessary program cost. The characteristics that govern space transport operations must be consistent with the philosophy to be eliminated by unnecessary risks. Experimental evidence indicates that due to various effects associated with ignition and combustion pressures Of the solid rocket reflections and the motions of the associated vehicles, the gap between Tang and the fork will be opened up to .017 and .029 inches in the secondary and primary rings. Respectively. - Recreation and reuse effects. The evidence that no other ferry element STS 51-L or the useful load contributed to the causes of the combustion gas leak of the field gasket of the right solid color field. Project managers for the various elements of the transportation program were more responsible. responsible. Its central management than to the organization of the transportation program. The structure of the ferry program of the transfer administration should be reviewed. The transport program made a conscious decision to postpone purchases of spare parts in favor of budgetary articles of the highest perceived priority. a. Examination pressure of the internal box. Spare parts are in a critical supply. The informal graphics applied to the NASA's photos of a variety of cameras in this sequence returned to place smoke puffs in the smoke sector of 270 to 310 degrees of the original smoke spurt. In the shuttle it increased its upward speed, flew more from the emerging and expanded smoke. Puffs Find the Challenger Accident GÁ genesis: The failure of the correct solid rocket joint, began with decisions taken on the design of the Board and in the failure of the Solid Project Office Rocket Booster of Thiokol and the NASA to understand and respond to the facts obtained. During the tests. Specifically, the commission has found that: 1. Sign policy should be established to assign useful loads. There was no margin in the system to accommodate unforeseen hardware problems. The telemid data indicate a wide variety of actions of the flight system that support the visual evidence of the photos, since the shuttle fought inhibitably against the forces that were destroying it. At about 72.20 seconds. The lower strut that unites the solid rocket reinforcement and the outer tank was cut off or moved away from the weakened hydrogen tank that allows the correct solid rocket reinforcement to rotate around the upper union strut. The two Cameras PAD 39B that would have recorded the precise location of the breath were inoperative. These factors were the effects of temperature, Physical, the character of the materials, the effects of the reuse, the processing and reaction of the joint to the dynamic load. Other safety considerations in the course of their investigation, the commission realized a series of That did not play part in the 51-L mission accident, but, however, he maintained a potential for security problems in the future. Some of these matters, those who involve operational concerns, took directly to the attention of the Commission by the NASA Astronaut Office. A fuel gas leak through the aft field seal of the correct solid rocket engine initiated in or little after the ignition, finally weakened and, or penetrated, the external tank that starts the structural rupture of the vehicle and the loss of the Challenger spatial transbotation during the STS 51-L mission. The result would have been an unacceptable time compression available so that the crews achieve their required training. The smoke seemed to blow from the joint. Rockwell did not make telephone calls or other objections to Aldrich or other NASA officials after the meeting of the Mission Mission 9 (A.M) and after the resumption of the countdown. The NASA system for monitoring the anomalies for flight preparation reviews failed in that, despite a history of the erosion of the persistent torus and the blow, the flight was allowed. The Silent Safety Program The Commission was surprised to realize many hours of testimony that NASA's security personnel was never mentioned. In the same way, there was no security representative in the Mission Administration team that made key decisions during the countdown in January. Torrel gasket resilience is directly related to its temperature. The challenging reaction control system was broken and a hypergolic burn of its propellants was produced as the oxygen-hydrogen flames came out. Review of Criticity and Hanging Analysis NASA and the main ferries contractors Check all elements of criticality 1, 1R, 2 and 2R and hazard analysis. In 1985, NASA published a projection that calls for an annual rate of 24 flights in 1990. The Agency constitutes a national resource that performs a critical role in exploration and the development of space. The pressure of the proper reinforcement chamber was lower, minor. The growing leak in the field of field board. In the flame column increased in size, it was diverted towards the strength of aerodynamic and circumferentially by the outstanding structure of the upper ring that binds the reinforcement to the outer tank. These systems do not have enough safety margin, particularly at the abortion landing sites. \* Specific conditions in which the landings planned in Kennedy should be determined. If these issues had been clearly established and emphasized in the process of preparation of the flight in terms that reflected the views of the majority of Thiokol engineers and at least some of the engineers of the Marshall (space flight center in Huntsville, Ala ), it seems likely that the launch of the 51-L could not have happened when he did it. 2. The accident after the takeoff in .678 seconds on the flight, the photographic data show a strong puff of gray smoke that is driven from the proximity of the stern field joint in the reinforcement of right solid rocket . The follow-up and the continues, the anomalies that are " outside the database " of the previous flight allowed that the main problems and those lost by the system of reports are eliminated. Numerous changes of late manifest have been performed (after reviewing the integration of the load) to the main useful loads and minor useful loads throughout the transport program. A careful analysis of the performance history of the performance of the Tórico Board would have revealed the correlation of the damages on the Tórico and the low temperature. A lumen ring that has been compressed will return to its original shape much more quick than a ring or cold when compression is relieved. Both NASA and ROCKETYNE have taken measures to contain that risk. The telechant changes in the pressurization of the tank of They confirmed the leak. An extensive and redundant security program that includes interdependent security, reliability and quality guarantee functions existed during and after the lunar program to discover any possible security problem. No witness related to approval, approval The disapproval of reliability engineers and none expressed the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of quality warranty staff. They were subject to a special audience. This chapter examines the potential risks in two general areas. This could be a new design eliminating the joint or redesignment of the seal and sealing of the current. All solid rocket engines meetings must meet the following requirements: \* Boards must be understood, proven and verified completely. \* The integrity of the structure and seals of all joints should not be less than that of the walls of the box along the designer envelope. . \* The integrity of the joints must be insensitive to-dimensional tolences. b. It is possible that the leak is continuous, but unobservable or non-existent in parts of the intermediate period. We can download our standards a little because we left the last time. C. Recommendation, the Commission has carried out a broad investigation of the Challenger accident to determine the probable cause and the necessary corrective actions. 8. The projections in the spring and summer of 1986 showed a clear trend: the system, as it existed, could not have delivered crew training software for flights scheduled by designated dates. Of special concern to the commission are the current abortion capabilities, the options to improve those capabilities, the options for the crew getaway and the performance of the range safety system. It is not the intention of the commission to guess the design of the space shuttle or try to represent the exhaust provisions that the crew of 51-L may have saved. The increasing flame was also incubated in the strut that unites the solid rocket elevator to the outer tank. The first visual indication that the flame of swirls Reflection of correct solid rocket raped the outer tank was 64,660 seconds when there was an abrupt change in form and color. of the pen. While each smoke flow stayed down through the flight up The shuttle, the next fresh breath could be seen near the level of the joint. -Traise the full range of operating conditions, including temperature. \* A complete consideration should be given to the realization of static shooting of the exact flight configuration in a vertical attitude. Launch of the abortion and crew Exhaust the management of the transport program that is considered first stage cancellation options and the crew exhaust options several times during the history of the program, but due to limited utility, the compensation. Nominating or the cost and schedule of the program, no systems were implemented. This released massive amounts of liquid hydrogen of the tank and created the sudden thrust forward of approximately 2.8 million pounds, pushing the hydrogen tank upwards towards the structure of Intertank. The launch site records show that the correct solid rocket motor segments were assembled using approved procedures. 12. This first very small flame was detected in an improved film by images at 58,788 seconds on the flight. This trend is totally disagreeing with the need for Marshall to work as part of a system that works for successful flight missions, interface and communicating with the other parts of the system that operate at the same purpose. After the commission began its work, and because of its suggestion, NASA began to free up a large amount of information that helped to reassure the public that all aspects of the accident were being investigated and that the full story was being told Ordated and exhaustive way. After the suggestion of the Commission, NASA established several teams of people who are not involved in the process of launching the 51-L mission to support the commission and its panels. Charging changes be controlled. Maintenance ... A new system must be established to monitor the performance of the critical components. Maintenance procedures must be specified, especially for the main engines powered by liquids. More, the Commission focused your attention on the security aspects of the future. future. On the basis of the lessons learned from the research with the objective of the objective of returning to Safe Flight. Consq, he recognized desirability, in the first instance, of having a single investigation of this national tragedy. Sabotage was not a factor. On the basis of the findings and determinations of your research, the Commission has adopted the recommendations to help ensure the return to a secure flight. The Commission urges that the NASA administrator present, one year of now, a report to the President on the progress that NASA has made the recommendations of the Commission that is detailed below: Disease is due Change the board and seal of a defective solid rocket. The Commission concluded that there was a serious failure in the decision-making process that led to the launch of 51-L flight. The spatial shuttle system was not designed to survive a failure of solid rocket reinforcements. -Specution and test procedures. This loss of effectiveness seriously degraded the controls and essential balances to maintain flight security. Develop recommendations for corrective action or other action based on the findings and determinations of the Commission. Immediately after being appointed, the Commission advanced with its investigation and with the full support of the White House that held public hearings that deal with the prior events. These NASA teams have cooperated with the Commission in all aspects of their work. The result has been a complete and complete investigation. The Commission believes that its investigation and report has been responsible for the request of the President and expected to serve the best interests of the nation to restore the United States Space Program to its eminent preposition in the world. However, this test program does not have The limits of the motor operating parameters or the tests included in the entire operating envelope to show the full capacity of the engine. Is in any case, the thrust vector and the normal response of the wind shear vehicle, as well as the planned maneuvers, restarted or increase the leakage of a degraded seal in the period that precedes the observed flames. There was pain and sadness for the loss of seven brave members of the crew; Sign the national resolution that these men and women are caught forever in the annals of American specs and a determination, based á €

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